OSGi Release 4 [10] . The publication process is not defined by these specifications, but relies on the Open Bundle The OSGi platform is a lightweight management layer Repository (OBR) format [11], which is supported by sevover a Java virtual machine that makes runtime extensieral Open Source OSGi implementations: the OBRI format bility and multi-application support possible in mobile and is supported by Oscar and Knopflerfish, and the OBR2 forconstraint environments. This powerfull capability opens mat is supported by Felix. a particular attack vector against mobile platforms: the in-
Introduction ment. Figure 1 shows the attack tree for executing malicious code on a client system [13] . Two main strategies exists: to The OSGi platform is on the way of becoming the de install a malicious platform, and to install malicious bunfacto standard componentization middleware for supportdles. The first strategy is prevented by the control of the ing extensible software, through the management layer it integrity of the framework when it is installed. The second provides to control the life-cycle of the so-called 'bundles', strategy can be realized through three different approaches: i.e. the OSGi components. However, the security characinserting malicious code during the development, inserting teristics of this life-cycle are hardly identified, in particular malicious bundles onto the bundle repositories, or installing during the deployment of the bundles which is usually realbundles from unauthorized repositories. The bundle issuer ized over insecure networks. We present here the tools we is responsible for guaranteeing that the code he provides is developed to support the secure deployment of bundles. The sound, which can be achieved through code analysis. The first tool, SF-Jarsignerl, covers the early life-cycle phases insertion of malicious bundles in the repositories or the inof the deployment, namely the signature of the bundles by stallation from unvalid repositories can be prevented by the their issuer and their publication. The second tool, SFelix2, digital signature of bundles. This paper presents the tools is actually an implementation of the digital signature validawe developed to perform this digital signature. Further intion layer of OSGi Release 4 specifications, and is based on formation is provided in the related technical report [12] . the Felix3 OSGi implementation. Both The download phase is typically done from a centralized repository [11] . However, the distribution of the resources over peer-to-peer overlay networks can be used with benefit, so as to increase the robustness of the infrastructure, efits it may provide to adaptable and extensible businessthe availability of the components [3] .The last phase of the critical systems are highly likely to require a firm underdeployment is the configuration of the components on the standing of its security implications, and the availability client. It builds the finalization phase of the deployment of of effective tools. The security infrastructure, which relies complex distributed systems, and is often overlooked when in a great part on the digital signature of bundles, is comdeploying single applications [6] . mon to all application domains, such as mobile commerce,
The tools we propose are based on the Bundle Reposwireless remote control, health-care monitoring, and videoitory Metadata to support the extraction of metadata dursurveillance. This infrastructure must be completed with ing the publication, and their resolution by the clients. The context-and application-specific security policies, which download is handled by the 'bundle repository' bundle at are out of the scope of this paper. the client's, which is part of the Felix framework. We inThe following of the paper is organized as follows. Sectegrate these existing facilities together with a publication tion 2 presents the related works. 
Secure Deployment 2 Related Works
The cardinal security properties are the integrity of the So as to define a secure process for deploying OSGi bundata, the authentication of their emitter, the confidentiality dles, it is necessary both to control the overall deployment of the communications and the non-repudiation of the acprocess, as well as the security mechanisms that can be used tions. Diverse approaches have been defined so as to ento protect it. We therefore present other research works reforce these properties on the context of component deploylated to the deployment process, and to the security aspects ment.
of deployment. cation of the bundle issuer and the guarantee of the integrity The publication step requires that both the components of the code. and the information necessary for the client to execute them An alternative to signature based on asymmetric cryptogproperly are made available: the component meta-data, deraphy is the use of Message Authentication Code (MAC) pendencies between components, the source location and based on symmetric key [9] . This provides a more the scope of the component release are published in 'release lightweight cryptographic mechanism, but is often considdatabases' [ 16] . The binding between the publishers and the ered as being less secure than asymmetric cryptography, because the secret key is shared among several entities. More- The first step is to sign the bundles, or to check that the provides digital signature using the same principle of digital existing signature is valid. The second step is the extraction signature of the bundles [2] . A similar mechanism has been of the meta-data of the signed bundles, and the publication defined to support the deployment of Web Services [4] . The onto a third party repository. The format of the meta-data is .Net framework also proposes a similar mechanism to sign defined by the OBR2 Request for Comments of the OSGi assemblies. Its main limitation is that the installed assemAlliance [11]. blies can not be removed, contrary to OSGi bundles, which
The client-side phase of the deployment is made of the makes it unproper for mobile and resource-constraint platdiscovery of the bundles, the dependency resolution, the forms.
download of the code archives, the validation of the dig- The SF-Jarsigner tool is compound of four graphical panels. The first panel let the archive publisher select a 3.1 Secure Deployment 'keystore' file, where its private/public key pair (respectively a public key) is stored for signing (respectively checkThe process of secure deployment is shown in figure 2. ing) bundles. The second panel is the one shown on figure The deployment of OSGi bundles is compound of issuance 3, it supports the signature or verification of bundles that phase, and a client-side phase.
are stored on the local system. The valid bundles are shown on the list on the right, and made available for publication.
in the Bouncycastle library. In an environment with reThe third panel allows to set and store the informations relstricted resources, it would be necessary to extract the reative to the remote file server where the bundles are to be quired classes from these library, so as not to overwhelm published. Currently, only the FTP protocol is supported. the available memory with unused code. The last panel lets the publisher choose among the available signed bundles which one are to be published. The The first is the Sun Jarsigner, with is part of the Java SDK.
The second is the SF-Jarsigner tool we provide. The Sun Jarsigner is available as a command line utility. The SF- Figure 3 . The Interface of the SF-Jarsigner Jarsigner is provided as a set of OSGi bundles, which support both a convenient use through a graphical user interface, or a programmatic use through services published inThe SF-Jarsigner tool is provided as OSGi bundles. fications, which consider that no new resource can be added to a signed archive. However, to provide compatibility with Sun tools, the SF-Jarsigner adds these additional meta-data. The SFelix platform is an extension of the Felix OSGi Consequently, it is possible to use any of those tools for implementation, which performs a bundle signature check performing the digital signature of OSGi bundles -or of before the bundles are installed. If the signature of a given other Java archives. The benefit of SF-Jarsigner lies 1) in bundle is unvalid, the bundle is rejected and the installation the convenient user interface and 2) in the support for bunis aborted.
dle publication. The SFelix security layer is provided as a Java library, and therefore not seen as actual bundles in the framework.
Signature Validation
The verification is performed as a single call to the 'jarvalidation' library we provide, and which is the same that the bundle used in the SF-Jarsigner tool. the_numerous_cryptographic_primitives_that_are_embedded that an OSGi bundle that has been modified will not be con4http://www.sfelix.free.fr/repository/repository-ppd.xml sidered as unvalid in all tools but ours.
The results of the experiments are the following. The Table 1 . over, the signature generation must be done to maintain the
